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1 Introduction 
In this paper I analyze the trade-off between growth and redistribution 
policies in a two-country world with ta.x competition and varying degrees 
of capital mobility. In many policy discussions that address the issue of 
growth vs. redistribution, setting higher tJ.xes for redistributive purposes 
is deemed to slow growth. Yet most developed and some developing coun-
tries redistribute a significant share of their GDP. Does this always lead 
to lower GDP growth? In the model developed in this paper it is argued 
that the experience of lower or higher GDP growth, when governments 
opt for redistribution, depends on who their opponents are when setting 
taxes in a non-cooperative environment. Furthermore, it is argued that 
the growth/redistribution trade-off problem depends on technology. 
Barro and Sala-i-MaJ:tin (1990) show that the government may 
have room to stabilize the private return on capital and through this the 
growth rate. The trade-off between growth and redistribution for a closed 
economy has, for instance, been analyzed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994). 
They show that a government that cares about the non-accumulated fac-
tor of production e:x."Periences slower growth if it redistributes resources 
to that factor. Bertola (1993) derives similar results in a different frame-
work. This vein of research suggests that in terms of growth the room 
for redistribution is limited for governments that wish to pursue redis-
tributive policies. 
The present paper extends the growth redistribution trade-off prob-
lem as formulated in Alesina and Rodrik (1991), {1994) to a two-country 
world. Each economy consists of two groups of agents, namely capi-
tal owners and workers. The workers never save, and supply labour 
inelastically.1 The capital owners do not work, accumulate capital and 
decide where to install their capital. To formulate the model in these 
terms keeps matters simple and allows one {1) to concentrate on the 
problem of growth and redistribution and (2) to relate to the literature 
1 Bertola (1993) derives this behaviour for utility maximizing agents. 
on majority voting on tax rates.2 
Capital is internationally mobile, but thls mobility is assumed to be 
in general less than perfect. The underlying forces governing the varying 
degrees of capital mobility are left unmodelled. Instead a convenient 
function is assumed to represent the net allocation of domestically owned 
capital in the foreign country. Autarky and perfect capital mobility are 
assumed to be limiting cases. 
Like Alesina and Rodrik I assume that the governments tax the 
capital owners' wealth, but not the non-accumulated factor of produc-
tion and that the wealth ta..x scheme represents a broader class of tax 
arrangements.3 That allows me to concentrate on problems associated 
with taxation of the accumulated factor of production in the growth 
process. By assumption expropriation of capital is ruled out for the 
governments.4 For open economies the following tax principles for capi-
tal income taxation are common. 5 
Under the 'residence principle' residents are taxed uniformly on 
their worldwide income regardless of the source of income (domestic or 
foreign), while non-residents are not taxed on income originating in the 
2See e.g. Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Scott (1981), and Mayer 
(1984). 
3The choice of tax base is not at all innocuous. As has been pointed out by 
Bertola (1991), (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) indirect taxation may lead to 
very different results as regards the growth redistribution trade-off. For instance, a 
capital income taxation cum investment subsidy tax scheme designed to equal a tax on 
consumption may guarantee higher growth for left-wing governments than right-wing 
ones as is shown in Rehme (1995a). 
4 Although a command optimum in this model would involve e::-..1Jropriation of cap-
ital even for a government ma.ximizing the welfare of the capital owners, I rule it out 
since it is not very common in the real world. Modelling why and when expropriation 
may come about is clearly outside the scope of this paper. 
5Razin and Yuen (1992) use an endogenous growth set-up in order to show that 
the residence principle is Ramsey efficient. This result seems to suffer from a time 
inconsistency problem since distortionary capital or wage taxation may produce time 
inconsistent solutions. [Cf. Fischer (1980), Charnley (1985).] Capital taxation in 
economies with high capital mobility has received quite some attention recently in 
e.g. Charnley (1992), Canzonieri (1989), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Gosh 
(1991) and Devereux and Shi (1991). 
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cmmtry. 
Under the 'source principle' all types of income originating in a 
country are taxed uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the 
income recipients. 
If a country loses capital it may suffer in terms of welfare of capital 
owners or workers. Given the danger of losing capital, the source prin-
ciple appears more suited as a tax principle, since the governments in 
a non-cooperative environment cannot perfectly monitor their residents' 
income or wealth. Therefore, in this paper the source principle for wealth 
taxation is adopted as a tax rule. 
In the optimum the capital owners allocate their capital depending 
on the after-tax returns in the economies.6 For given public policies in the 
two economies, I show that in a market equilibrium the GDP and GNP 
growth rates depend crucially on the capital allocation decision and that 
in general GDP and GNP do not grow at the same rate. In particular, 
in this model GDP growth is a weighted average of GNP growth where 
the weights vary over time and depend on the after-tax returns. 
I then conduct a public policy analysis. I assume that the govern-
ments in each country are taken to be of two types. They are either 
'right-wing' and only care about the capital owners, or they are 'left-
wing' caring about labour only. The governments' objectives reveal that 
a right-wing government wants to maximize GNP, whereas a left-wing 
government is concerned about redistribution, GDP and GDP growth. 
I show that in a closed economy the right-wing government acts growth 
maximizing. 
Next, I assume that the governments have to choose ta.xes andre-
distribution non-cooperatively and engage in tax competition.' The ob-
6 For two-sector growth models and shifting of resources for investment see, for 
instance, Inada (Hl63), Rahman (1963), Intriligator (1964), Ryder (1969), Hamada 
(1969), Pitchford (1977) or Bagchi, Olsder and Strijbos (1981). 
7 Tax competition between fiscal authorities has been studied in numerous pa-
pers such as, for instance. Gordon (1983). Zoclrow imd .\Iieszokowski (1986), Wil-
son (1986), \Vildasin (1988), Wildasin (1989). Gordon (1992), Bond and Samuelson 
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jectives also imply that the welfare maximizing governments implicitl:r 
compete for capital.8 The governments (left or right-wing) in each coun-
try (domestic and foreign) move simultaneously, but bPforc the private 
sector.9 
For technologically similar economies it is shuwn that. in the Nash 
Equilibria of the tax competit.ion game there may be no room for redis-
tribution for two left-wing governments. This result holds for sufficiently 
high capital mobility. For very low capital mobility the governments re-
distribute, but less than in the open economy. The intuition behind this 
result is the following: The left-wing governments face the trade-off be-
tween growth and redistribution. For the latter they need capital which 
is internationally mobile. They can only get more capital if they set a tax 
rate that approaches the one guaranteeing the maximum after-ta.x return. 
For redistribution they want to set higher ta.xes. Since it is capital that 
is being redistributed, tax competition causes a left-wing government to 
concentrate on securing high enough wages. By this the effects of the 
concern for wealth inequality are reduced. The result is driven by capital 
mobility and strategic interaction between two governments which have 
the same preferences. 
If a left-wing and a right-wing government compete in taxes the 
strategic interaction is shown to be less. The reason for this is that 
the right-wing government is not concerned about redistribution. It just 
wishes to maximize the capital owners' utility by securing them a max-
imum after-tax ret~·n on capital. Since the after-ta.x return determines 
growth, it maximizes GNP growth and by this it also attracts foreign 
capital. The lack of reclistributive concern makes its problem a lot sim-
pler. In the model it results in an extremely simple reaction function 
which the right-wing government possesses regardless of who its oppo-
nent may be. Given the fixed right-wing reaction function, the left-wing 
(1989), Coates (1993), Kanbur and Keen {1993), or Lockwood (1903). 
8 For instance, competition for capital has recently been analyzed by Sinn (1993). 
9 For a model that studies the related problem of solving the trade-off between the 
provision of government consumption goods and growth in a Barra (1990) world see 
Devereux and Mansoorian (1992). 
government knows it cannot attract foreign capital and as a consequence 
it chooses to redistribute, albeit less than in the closed economy, and 
experience lower GDP growth. 
Is is then shown that as capital mobility increases the left-wing 
governments begin mimicking right-wing policies. From the argument 
above and given high capital mobility it follows that two competing left-
wing governments will optimally set tax rates closer to the GNP growth 
maximizing one than under left-right competition. 
Next, the paper addresses the issue of technological efficiency dif-
ferences. I argue that as long as an efficiency gap can be maintained 
the efficient country will get more capital. This is especially true for an 
efficient left-wing government. If the gap is large enough it may be able 
to guarantee redistribution and higher GDP growth than a right-wing 
opponent. From this the aforementioned trade-off appears to be less im-
portant vis-a-vis opponents with other preferences. That suggests that 
the growth redistribution trade-off may not be a question of being right 
or left-wing (preferences), but rather a problem of being efficient or not 
(technology). 
Finally, for some capital mobility this may have the surprising im-
plication that a left-wing government may be better off in terms of GDP 
growth if it faces competition from another left-wing government. This 
goes with the cost of a reduction in or no redistribution. Competing 
against a right-wing government in turn allows for some redistribution 
in the optimum, at the cost of reduced GDP growth. 
From the above one may conclude that high GDP growth and redis-
tribution may be possible if a country is sufficiently efficient. Government 
preferences alone may not adequately e:x.-plain the pattern of growth and 
redistribution in open economies with wealth tax competition, differences 
in strategic behaviour and varying degrees of factor mobility. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model 
set-up, derives the equilibrimn in a closed economy and briefly presents 
the optimal policy choices as have been put forth in Alesina and Rodrik 
(1991). Section 6 formulates a game where governments with different 
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political objectives compete in wealth tax rates. The main results of this 
paper are stated in propositions. Section T concludes. 
2 The Model 
Consider a two-country world with a "domestic" and a "foreign" coun-
try. Let us denote variables in the foreign country by a (*). There are 
two types of many identical individuals in each country. In each coun-
try the types have the same rate of time preference, p. 10 One type of 
individuals owns capital and no labour and the other type owns labour, 
but no capital. Let us call the latter group 'workers' (lV) and the former 
group 'capitalists' (k). Workers and capitalists are assumed to derive 
logarithmic utility from the consumption of a homogeneous, malleable 
good that is produced in the two countriesY This assumes that foreign 
and domestic output,}'~ and 1';* are perfect substitutes in consumption. 
Those who own capital, own shares of two representative firms. 
There are many firms assumed to be production units only. Following 
Barro (1990) aggregate production takes place according to 
Yi = A K'( Gi-"' Li-"', where 0 < a: < 1 
8@* 
. < 0 
8 *- l Wt 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
where Yi is output produced in the home country, K 1 the net overall 
domestically installed real capital stock, k1 (k;) is the real capital stock 
owned by domestic (foreign) capitalists, G1 are public inputs to produc-
tion and A is an efficiency index, which depends on cultural, institutional 
10So each type in e.g. the domestic country has the same time preference. One may 
justify this by assuming that each type belongs to an infinitely lived dynasty. 
11 This specification is adopted for analytical convenience. The model can be ex-
tended to more general classes of utility functions without altering the qualitative 
results. 
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and technological development indicators. In this paper I focus on en-
dogenous growth by eliminating all exogenous factors that may play a 
role in the growth process by assuming that A is constant over time. 
Furthermore, I set L 1 = 1, so that labour is supplied inelastically over 
time. The function ¢*(w;) captures the fact that capital may be imper-
fectly mobile. Imperfect capital mobility may be clue to many factors 
including, for instance, installation or transfer costs. However, in this 
model the exact influence of these factors on capital transfers is left un-
moclellecl and for simplicity I will assume that ¢* depends on w;, i.e. the 
allocation decision u..•; of the investors in the foreign country investing in 
the domestic country. Furthermore, the capital mobility functions are 
assumed to be symmetric so that ¢ = ¢*. 
The variable w1 E [0, 1] denotes the fraction of real capital at date t 
owned by domestic capitalists installed in the home country. The fraction 
¢(wt) is installed abroad by the domestic cc:.pitalists. Similar reasoning 
applies to the foreign capitalists and ¢*(w;). 
I will call the economies similar if A = A* since the countries may 
well be different in terms of institutional or cultural development. I will 
refer to the economies as being different if A > A*, that is, if the countries 
are significantly different in their cultural, institutional or technological 
development. For instance, A> A* may capture the situation when one 
compares a developed Northern with a less-developed Southern coun-
try. I will also abstract from problems arising from depreciation of the 
capital stock. Note that by assumption installed foreign and domestic 
capital are perfect substitutes. This abstracts from the possibility that 
foreign capital may be a necessary input for domestic production. As it 
is the aim of this paper to model tax competition with the consequence 
of attracting capital, assuming complementarity would only exacerbate 
that competition, but would not change the results of this paper in any 
fundamental way. 12 
12The following is worth noting: I hm·e assumed imperfect capital mobility and 
perfect substitution in consumption of the same good. Call it ectoplasm, cf. Barra 
and Sala-i-Martin (1905 ). Note that ectoplasm and its fruits are assumed to be ed-
ible (consumption good), the fruits can also he used as investment for growing more 
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2.1 The Public Sector 
The governments in both countries redistribute and ta.x wealth at con-
stant rates at each point in time. Let T be the tax rate on real capital 
(wealth) which is held domestically by domestic investors and on capital 
installed in the home country. Thus, T is levied on w1 k1• The govern-
ment also ta.xes the real foreign capital located in the home country, 
i.e. cf;*(w;)k;. Analogous definitions hold for the foreign country. This 
way of taxing wealth means that the colmtries adopt the source prin-
ciple as a ta.x rule which requires that all types of wealth present in a 
country be ta.xed uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the 
owners of wealth. If capital is internationally mobile it makes sense to 
adopt this principle since goverlllllents in a non-cooperative environment 
cannot perfectly monitor their residents' wealth. 
Given the Barro-type production function I define the following 
government budget constraint, which is assumed to be balanced at each 
point in time 
The LHS depicts the ta.x revenues and the RHS public expenditures. The 
workers receive the fraction A of tax revenues, that is, ATE~, as transfers 
and G1 is spent on public inputs to production. The parameter A is as-
sumed to represent the degree of (capital) redistribution in the economy. 
Rearranging and taking into account that the domestic government may 
have two som·ces of "tax revenues we contemplate the following budget 
constraint: 
(4) 
We may note that T is set by the government independently of other 
ectoplasm. I assume that capital is in general less productive abroad and shipping is 
costless. Then installation abroad will take place if the ret urn abroad is higher. vVher-
ever the owner's ectoplasm trees are located, im·estment in new ectoplasm trees in 
the particular country is assumed costless. Production is conducted with the actually 
installed trees, of course. That explains the 0 in Y1• 
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factors in the economy which corresponds to the uniform taxation of 
wealth as required by the strict form of the source principle. 13 
2.2 The Private Sector 
The private sector is made up of many identical firms, workers and capital 
owners. 
The firms in each country operate in a perfectly competitive envi-
ronment and act as profit maximizers. The firms are owned by domestic 
and foreign capital owners. Foreign and domestic capitalists rent capital 
to and demand shares of the representative domestic firm. The same 
holds for the foreign firm. The domestic capitalists' assets are their 
shares of the firms. The shares of the domestic and foreign firms are 
collateralized one-to-one by physical capital. The markets for assets and 
physical capital are assumed to clear at each point in time. For conve-
nience assume that the representative domestic firm faces a given path of 
the market clearing rental rate, {rt}, of domestically installable capital, 
Kt.14 Given perfect competition the firms in the domestic economy rent 
capital and hire labour in spot markets in each period in their country. 
We assume that foreign and domestic output are perfect substitutes in 
consumption and set the price of Yi and !'";* equal to 1. Given constant 
returns to capital and labour, factor payments exhaust output. Profit 
maximization then entails that firms pay each factor of production its 
13Differential taxation of foreigners and residents in the presence of perfect capital 
mobility has been taken up in Rehme (1995b). In contrast, in this paper the strict 
form will be assumed to hold. As shown in e.g. Razin and Sadka (1994) or Bovenberg 
(1994) the source principle entails a uniform ta.."'<ation of residents' and foreigners' 
capital income. The model can in principle allow for discriminatory taxation at the 
expense of considerable technical complications. Of course, the question whether tax 
discrimination plays a major role in the equilibria below is of interest, but then all the 
equilibria found in this paper may be interpreted as and shown to be results about 
average tax rates in a model with discriminatory ta.."'<ation. 
14The assumptions that assets are collateralized one-to-one and the rental rate 
of capital is - later on - uniform and for simplicity constant can easily be relaxed 
without altering the results. For a justification of these assumptions cf. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995), Chpt. 2. 
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marginal product 
aY 
r = al~t = o:A.[(1- .A)rjl-", (5) 
w1 = ;~: = 1J(r,>.)K1 = (1- o:)A[(1- .A)rjl-"'K~> L 1 = 1,Vt. (6) 
Equation (5) implies an intra-country arbitrage which makes the return 
on foreign and domestic capital installed in each firm equal in the domes-
tic country. The same, of comse, applies to the foreign country. Notice 
that the retmn on capital is constant, whereas the wages vary over time 
depending·on the evolution of the installed capital stock. It can be seen 
that the tax rate has a bearing on the marginal product of capital. Use 
the definitions given in ( 4), and ( 5), assume 0 < Wt ~ 1, 0 ~ cp* ( w;) < 1 
and fixed for the home country and let E = (1- o:)A[(1- >.)rJ-"'. Then 
or 01" 
07 = o:E(1- A) > 0 , a>. = o:E( -r) < 0 . (7) 
So redistribution has a negative effect on the retmn on capital and in-
creases in the tax rates raise the rate of return. For the wages, (TJK1), we 
obtain the following relationships that are easy to verify 
~~ = (1- o:)E(1- >.) > 0 , ~1 = (1- o:)E( -r) < 0. (8) 
Thus for given Wt, w; an increase in T leads to a positive change in the 
rate of retmn and in wages. Redistribution lowers each of them. 
The workers are assumed to derive a utility stream from consuming 
their wages and government transfers. They do not invest and are not 
taxed by assumption.15 Their intertemporal utility is given by 
l:olnC1we-P1dt where CJ~'=TJ(r,>.)Kt+ArKt. (9) 
This assumption is reminiscent of growth models such as Kaldor (1956), 
where different proportions of profits and wages are saved. However, in 
15Negative values for .A would be tantamount to wage ta.'i:es or taxes on human 
capital. In order to focus on the effects of capital ta.'i:ation I will abstract from any 
effects of wage taxes on the economies. 
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Kaldorian models the growth rate determines the factor share incomes, 
whereas in endogenous growth models such as this one the direction is 
rather from factor shares to the growth rate. (On this distinction see, for 
example, Bertola (1993).) 
The capitalists in each country cannot move, and choose how much 
to consume or invest. Each individual capitalist takes the paths of 
( r, r*, r, r*) as given. Since the capital owners have the opportunity to 
invest in either country they have to determine where their capital is to 
be located, w1• Recall that we have assumed that imperfect capital mo-
bility may prevail so that that less than (1 - wt) of domestically owned 
capital is generally installed abroad. The capitalists have perfect fore-
sight and maximize their intertemporal utility according to the following 
programme 
max foo lnC'J.: e-P1dt (lOa) c~,w, lo t 
s.t. k1 = (r- r)w1k1 + (r*- r*)¢(wt)k1 - ct (lOb) 
Q :::; Wt :::; 1 
/,:(0) = k0 , k('XJ) =free. 
(lOc) 
(lOd) 
Equation (lOb) is the dynamic budget constraint of the capitalists. So 
the capitalists earn income at home rw1k1 and abroad, r*¢(wt)k1• Fur-
thermore, I assume that re-investment of profits earned in a country is 
costless in that particular country. The necessary first order conditions 
for this problem are given by (lOb), (lOc), (lOd) and the following equa-
tions: 
1 C'f- f-lt = 0 
flt(r- r)kt + J-lt(r*- r*)¢/(wt)kt = 0 
fit = fltP- flt [(r- T)Wt + (r*- r*)¢(wt)] 
lim ktp 1e-P1 = 0. t-':10 
(lla) 
(llb) 
(llc) 
(lld) 
where J-lt is a positive co-state Yariable which can be interpreted as the 
instantaneous shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. 
Equation (lla) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow 
11 
price of more investment, ( 11c) is the standard Euler equation which 
relates the costs of foregone investment (LHS) to the discounted gain in 
marginal utility (RHS), noting zk = p1, and (11d) is the transversality 
condition for the capital stock which ensures that the present value of the 
capital stock approaches zero asymptotically. Equation ( 11 b) describes 
the capitalists' capital allocation decision, which is deprndent on the 
after-ta.x returns in the two countries, since 
r-T ¢>'(wt) = ---. 
r*- T* 
If we totally differentiate this expression we see that the allocation deci-
sion Wt is increasing in the ratio of the domestic to the foreign after-tax 
returns, 
dw1 1 "( ) d(...!:......I_) = - dl'(w ) :2: 0, where ¢> w1 < 0. 
r•-r• . l 
Thus, if the domestic after-tax return increases, then the capitalists in-
stall more capital at home. To fix ideas and keep matters simple I will 
consider the following explicit ¢> function: 
(12) 
This function obeys all the restrictions I have put on cj> earlier on.16 
The parameter z measures the degree of capital mobility imperfection. 
If z --+ oo (0) we have perfect capital mobility (autarky)Y Then the 
16It is immediate that"¢/,¢/' :S 0. In order to check if ,P(w) :S (1- w) let d = 
(1- w)- ,P(w). Then dw = -1 + and dw,w = ~w~-l establishes that uJ = 1 
minimizes d for any z E [0, oo) so that d :0:: 0. Nm~ let m = and note that 
m= = <=~Il 2 :0::0. Then m---> 0 (1) as z--+ 0 (oo). Suppose w < 1. Then for z--+ 0 we 
have w1+~ --+ 0 and m --+ 0 so that d--+ 1- w > 0. For z --+ oo we have w 1+~ --+ "'-' 
and m--+ 1 so that d--> 0. From this I conclude that (1- w) :0:: ,P(w) for all :: E [0, oo) 
and w E [0, 1]. 
17vVe may think of the exogenous :: as reflecting the ex ante outcome of a bargaining 
process between two countries that has become legally binding. Then the fact that 
governments alter in office clearly matters, but I assume that the contract is binding 
so that, for instance, a government preferring autarky cannot shut its economy off 
if the contract specifies otherwise. This is a realistic specification for most countries 
that have entered some unilateral or multilateral trade agreements. 
12 
optimal decision rule is given by 
"-'=min{(~)= ,1}. 1~*- 7* (13) 
This ex-pression is increasing in the domestic after tax return for r:::::~. < 1 
and constant over time. If the after-tax return ratio is larger or equal 
to 1, then the investors leave their capital in their home country, w = 
1, ¢(w) = 0. If the foreign after-tax return goes up at r:::::~. 2:: 1, the 
investors may shift their capital abroad. Then, depending on the after-
tax returns in the two countries the growth rate of consumption follows 
in a standard way from (llc) and (13): 
It= Cf /Cf = (r r)w + (r* r*)¢(w) p. (14) 
So consumption growth is increasing in the after-tax returns. Suppose 
the capitalists' capital stock and their consumption grow at the same 
rate. Then this means that the capital stock of the capitalists grows at a 
rate which depends on the after-tax returns in the two countries. If the 
after-tax returns are such that w :::; 1, then all the growth of domestically 
owned capital takes place in the home country. If the foreign after-tax re-
turn is sufficiently high it becomes attractive for the domestic investor to 
shift capital abroad. Then the domestically owned capital stock grows at 
a rate that is a mixture of contributions of home and foreign investment. 
Finally, note that from (14) and (lOb) the instantaneous consumption of 
the capitalists in steady state is given by Ct = pkt.18 
3 Market Equilibrium 
The constancy of r, r* implies constancy of r, r* and w,w* and hence 
/, 1*. For the rest of the paper let the partial derivative of a variable x 
with respect to a variable y be denoted by xy. 
18In section 3 it is shown that for constant ta.' rates we get balanced growth such 
that 'Y = Cf/Cf = ktfkt. 
13 
3.1 Two-Country World 
I will first look at the dynamic market equilibrium of the domestic econ-
omy in our two-country world given arbitrary tax rates. Let us define 
v(t) = ~;,' and v*(t) = q,·~~~)ki as the shares of domestic and foreign 
capital in overall installed capital. To save on notation let v(O) = v and 
v*(O) = v*. 
Divide (lOb) by kt, and use the fact that in steady state ~fk is con-
stant. Rearranging and taking time derivatives yields 1 = /'k where 1 
is given by (14) and constant. Substituting 1 for lk in (lOb) estab-
lishes Cf = pk1 as the instantaneous consumption of the capital mvn-
ers in steady state. Hence, in the open economy the domestic cap-
italists' consumption grows at the same, constant rate as their cap-
ital stock. The same holds for the foreign capitalists. In the two-
country world with given w, w* the domestic resource constraint is given 
by 11 = GDP1 - C{'- ct- G~> i.e. 
where I have defined C{' as a residual and call C{' the aggregate con-
sumption of the domestic and foreign capitalists consuming the domestic 
output at date t. Then we use the binding constraint, C:V = [1J + >.r]K1• 
Recall lk = 1 and lk· = 1*. Then K1 = w k1 + ¢* k; and the constancy 
of 1, 1* entails k1 = e71k0 and k; = e-t"tk~. Thus, K 1 = we71 k0 + ¢*e7• 1 k~ 
and I(1 = 1we-11 k0 + l*¢*e7• 1 k~. Then the growth rate of the aggregate 
capital stock at any t is given by 
(15) 
Notice that this growth rate is a weighted average of the growth rates 
of the domestic and the foreign capitalists' capital stock and it is not 
constant over time. To see this we calculate 
14 
wkoc1'9• k•l,-, • t where~= K" n · • Thus, f 1 is increasing over time, unless 1 = , •. 
Next, I wish to fuel lim f 1 if~~> 1* which is given by l-'XI 
Lemma 1 The GDP growth rate f 1 is increasing over time, ~ > 0, for 
any 1 =f-1*. If 1 > 1*, then lim f 1h>-r· =~f. 1-oo 
So the GDP growth rate approaches the domestic GNP growth rate, 
if 1 > 1*. Furthermore, at time 0 I get f 0 = f F from the produc-
tion function and the fact that output is equal to GDP in equilibrium. 
Thus, GDP and the aggregate capital stock grow at the same rate. Also 
f 0 = dw ;cw from the workers' budget constraint. Hence, at t = 0 the 
economy will be characterized by balanced growth for K 1, Yi, Ct, that 
is, fo = fy = fcw. 19 
From this it is dear that w, w* play a crucial role in determining 
the equilibrium in our two-cotmtry world. But since the tax parame-
ters are given arbitrarily at this stage one cannot say anything about 
the exact form of our equilibrium. It appears that arbitrary levels and 
combinations of tax rates would sustain multiple market equilibria. Eco-
nomically, this suggests that one cannot say very interesting things about 
the economies liDless more structure is being put on the way taxes are 
set, which will be the objective of the tax competition game I will con-
template below. 
19Recall that~~= C:f /Cf. Thus, there is a crucial difference between GDP or GNP 
consumption growth of the capital owners. For instance, if we devide the resource 
constraint by /{1 then we may get an expression r 1 - ( r - r) = ~. Taking time 
- cK (ct< ) . derivatives yields f 1 = 7f;- 7'fr- f 1 • We know that r, evaluated at t = 0 depends 
on ( 7 - -r* f so that in general r c·~· ~ ro. 
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3.2 Closed Econmny 
For a closed economy w = 1, I\1 = k1• It is not difficult to see then 
that the market equilibritml is characterized by steady state, balanced 
growth, that is, IY = /'k = /' = lew with 1 = (r - r) - p where 
r = o:A.[(1 - .A)rp-a. The ( r, /\) combination that maximizes growth 
must satisfy 1';., ::; 0 and r.,. = 1. From ( 7) we get that r.\ < 0 so that 
.A = 0 and from rr - 1 = 0 we obtain f = [a( 1 - o: )A];\- as the growth 
ma.ximizing ( T, .A) combination. 
Lemma 2 The ( r, .A) combination that maximizes growth in a closed 
economy is given by .A= 0 and f = [o:(1- o:)A]!> where f .solves 1"r = 1. 
The relationship between the wealth ta..\: rate and growth in a closed 
economy can be read off from figure 1 below. At f the growth rate is 
Figure 1: The relationship between~~ and T in a closed economy 
-y(r) 
I 
T 
T f 
Parameter values: a= t, p = 0.001, A= 2. 
maximal. If higher taxes - for example for wealth redistribution (.A > 0) 
- are levied, then T > f and the growth rate decreases. i.e. growth is 
traded off against redistribution at a point such as f with .A > 0. 
The a:fter-ta.\: return is given by 
r- T = o:A.[(1 - /\)rp-a- T = T ( o:.A[(1 - .A)rt"- 1). 
Substitution of the growth maximizing (r, .A) combination establishes 
P - f = f ( 1 ~a) . The effect of a marginal increase in efficiency on 
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the ma..'cimum growth rate is given by d(r-7-l dA 
f[a2 (1 a)A.]-1 > 0. Hence, 
= (....!:!:__) dr where dr = 
1-a dA dA 
Lemma 3 The maximum after-tax return is 1~ - f = f ( 1 ~0,). An 
increase in efficiency raises the maximum growth rate, the maximum 
after-tax return and the growth maximizing tax rate, that is, :~ > 0, 
j=i',(r-f),f. 
The result that a more efficient economy may have higher maximum 
growth corresponds to common economic intuition and is hardly surpris-
ing. The lemma will be useful below. In terms of Figure 1 we may think 
of an increase in A. as an upward shift of the concave relationship between 
taxes and growth. 
4 The Government 
I will consider government objectives where each domestic government 
maximizes the welfare of its domestic clientele. The governments are 
assumed to take as their welfare measure the intertemporal utility of their 
clientele.20 In appendix A I show that a domestic right-wing (strictly 
20We know from the theory of optimal taxation that the government's objective can 
be stated in terms of the indirect utility function. Note that the welfare function is a 
function of the government's instruments and that this function need not necessarily 
coincide with the individual agents' utilities as noted in e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1989), chpt.l2 and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). For example, an earlier version of 
this paper assumed that the domestic right-wing government represented the interests 
of the (domestic and foreign) capital owners as a class. Then a right-wing government 
would be interested in GDP growth and would have an objective function very similar 
to a left-wing government's one. Both right and left-wing governments would then 
compete in taxes for capital. But as governments are voted for by their national 
constituencies, this kind of class objective is inconsistent with a truly representative 
democracy. It is an interesting question whether pro-capital governments are truly 
and only representing their national voters (capital owners) in reality. The answer 
to that question is outside this model. Instead, I now assume that the governments 
really do represent the national capital owners' interests only. 
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pro-capitalists) government (r) has the following objective function 
if'= fcc 1nC~e-P1dt = lnC~ + ]_ 
Jo p p2 (16) 
where C~ = pko, ~I= (r- r)w + (1·*- r*)¢(w) p. 
Notice that the growth rate here is that of k1 and not K 1• This follows 
from the fact that the right-wing government serves domestic capitalists 
only and is therefore concerned about GNP and not GDP. 
Similarly, the welfare measure of a domestic left-wing (strictly pro-
labour) government ( l) integrates to 
where I have used integration by parts to show that V1 depends on r 1. 
Notice that the left-wing government is concerned about GDP and the 
growth rate of GDP, since wages depend on K 0 , the overall installed 
capital stock at t = 0. 
In appendix A I show that the two objective functions vr and V 1 in 
(16), (17) are increasing in (ko,/) and continuous in tax rates for given 
w, w*. Thus, given ~verything else getting more domestic capital is in the 
interest of right and left-wing governments in this model. Furthermore, 
welfare of the workers is also increasing in k0, ~I*. So it turns out that each 
government's objective possesses the feature that is implicitly compatible 
with some other objective, namely that of increasing the growth rate of 
domestically owned capital. So any policy that generates higher domestic 
capitalists' capital growth is in the interest of both types of government 
since it raises each group's welfare. From this I conclude that in this 
model the objective to ma:-dmize the welfare of workers or capitalists and 
maximizing GNP growth are positively related, that is, they represent 
some - possibly the same - underlying preferences in different ways. 
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5 The Government's Problem in a Closed 
Economy 
Suppose the government in the closed economy (w = 1,w* = 1) cares 
about both capitalists and workers. Respecting the right of private prop-
erty, the government ha.'i to choose T and A to solve the following in-
tertemporal problem, which is equivalent to the model of Alesina and 
Rodrik: 
max (1 - !3) vr + f3 111 s.t. A ~ 0 
T,A 
where vr, l/1 are given hy the expressions in (16) and (17). The param-
eter f3 E [0, 1] represents the welfare weight attached to the two groups 
in the economy. If f3 = 1, (0) the government cares about the workers 
(capitalists) only. I will call 
f3 = 1, (0) - a left-wing (right-wing) government. 
The constancy of f3 may he justified by interpreting f3 as reflecting the 
socio-economic institutions in an economy. Then the fact that govern-
ments alternate in office becomes less of an issue since institutional fea-
tures are usually constant for very long periods of time. 
The condition A ~ 0 restricts the governments so that even a right-
wing government does not ta.x workers. In that sense even a right-wing 
government is 'nice' to the workers. A negative A would effectively 
amOlmt to a tax on wages. At this stage let ;1 E [0, 1]. Then the so-
lution to the government's problem is presented in appendix B and is 
given hy: 
If /3p ~ [(1- o:)A]-!; then: 
f = j3p, 
If j3p < [(1- o:)A]-!; then: 
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~ = 1 _ !..:...[ ( 1_---=o:_:_) A__,]'-~ 
.Bp 
(18) 
f[1- a(1- a).-:!.f-"] = ;3p(1- 1t), (19) 
A right-wing government, j3 = 0, is only concerned about growth in this 
model. It chooses the the growth maximizing (T, A) combination. Recall 
that by Lemma 2 the growth maximizing tax rate with A= 0 is given by 
f = [a(l- a)A.]~. (20) 
From (20) and (18), we see that f > f when A :::: 0 so that growth is not 
maximized. This can be visualized using Figure 1. Thus, a redistributing 
government (A > 0) trades off growth against redistribution at a point 
such as f, A > 0. It is interesting to note that {3 is inversely related to the 
growth rate. Another implication is that there is a wide range of values 
where no wealth redistribution takes place. Note that if pis a lot lower 
than (3, i.e. capitalists and workers are patient, then even a left-wing 
government might not redistribute as can be seen in (19). But unless 
p = 0 a left-wing government will set higher taxes than a right-wing one 
and have lower growth - in this model. 
Suppose the left-wing government redistributes wealth in the opti-
mum. Then (18) holds with A > 0. I will now check under what condi-
tions we have l' > 0 with/\ > 0. If (18) holds then (1- A)f = [(1-a)A]~. 
Let 8 =: (1 a )A, then 
r = nA[(l - A)f] 1-o = aAG 1 -;;" = (-a-) 8~. 
1-a 
From (18) we have f = p:::: e~ and for~/> 0 we haver- f- p > 0. So 
f = p has to satisfy 
:r > e<> A -- e<> > 2:r {::} f -- e<> > e<>2r {::} a > -. 1 (0')1 (0')1 1 2 1-a 1-a 3 
Notice that from (1) a measures the elasticity of output w.r.t. private 
capital. Thus, private capital k1 has to be sufficiently more important in 
production than public inputs G1• Furthermore, for an increase in A one 
finds ~~ < 0 so that A would be lower in the new optimum. Hence, 
Lemma 4 For a redistTibuting (A > 0), left-wing government 1 > 0 
only if a > ~· An increase in efficiency makes the left-wing government 
redistribute less wealth given its optimal policy, that is, ~~ < 0. 
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This is an interesting implication of the model in Alesina and Rodrik 
(1991), which they do not discuss. The lemma is clearly empirically rel-
evant and testable. For example, it entails that an increase in efficiency 
causes the left-wing government to redistribute less wealth in the opti-
mum and place more weight on growth. Finally, we may note that the 
optimal tax rates are non-zero.21 
In order to concentrate on the distributional conflict I will only look 
at the border cases of (3 = 1 ('left-wing'), and j3 = 0 ('right-wing') in the 
next sections. 
6 Tax Competition in a Two-Country 
World with Capital Mobility 
In this section I investigate what happens to the optimal choices of tax 
rates and redistribution parameters if these choices have to be made in a 
two-country world with capital mobility and countries cannot coordinate 
their policies. This is a relevant question for countries where full tax 
harmonization may not be possible. There is a possibility then that 
countries engage in ta.x competition.22 I will look for a Nash Equilibrium 
of the game described below. The strategies of the two governments are 
the choices of r, >. and r*, >. * and only pure strategies are considered. For 
the formulation of the game I employ the following 
Assumptions: 
1. There is no uncertainty. Perfect lmowledge about all the parame-
ters, objective functions, the strategies and the sequence of moves 
prevails. 
21 Thls is due to the assumption that A is non-negative and labour supply is inelastic. 
As has been shown by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993a) and Jones, Manuelli and 
Rossi (1993b) and in contrast to, for instance, Charnley (1986) this leads to non-zero 
tax rates on capital income. 
22 For a similar point see, for instance, Bovenberg (1994). 
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2. All agents act non-cooperatively. 
3. The governments move simultaneously. 
4. The private sector, that is, the workers and the capitalists move 
simultaneously. 
5. The governments move before the private sector. 
6. At each point in time the agents are confronted with the same 
problem. 
7. Agents remember at t only what they have done at date 0. 
8. k0 = k~, i.e. both economies have the same initial capital stock. 
(Unless stated otherwise.) 
9. A = A*, i.e. the economies are equally efficient or similar. (Unless 
stated otherwise.) 
10. p = p*, i.e. the agents' time preference rates are equal across coun-
tries. 
Assumption (5.) defines a game the solution to which is called a Ramsey 
Equilibrium. This is similar to a Stackelberg Leadership Solution, where 
the governments are the Stackelberg leaders.23 Assumption (6.) defines 
a repeated game and (7.) means that the information structure is open-
loop.24 If the capitalists can invest in a global environment it makes sense 
to assume that they have the same rate of time preference. 
formulate the distributional conflict between capitalists and workers in a closed 
economy as a dynamic game has, for example, been done in Lancaster (1973), Pohjola 
(1983), Basar, Haurie and Ricci (1985), Mehrling (1986), Haurie and Pohjola (1987), 
Shimonura (1991), de Zeeuw (1992), or Seierstad (1993). 
24The justification for assuming this information structure may lie in the fact that 
democratic governments of either political leaning may constantly be reminded of their 
pre-election promises so that the outcome of the game in the first stage provides a 
benchmark for their decisions at timet. If the governments could remember the whole 
history of the game, time inconsistency issues would emerge. Modelling problems 
of time inconsistency and assuming appropriate trigger strategies for a closed loop 
information structure is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus it is implicitly assumed 
that governments commit themselves to their decisions. How this commitment is 
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From the assumptions about the game the following should be 
noted: Given the timing of moves and the assumption on the informa-
tion structure the game is reduced to a two-stage game. First the public 
sector (Stackelberg leader) moves and then the private sector (Stackelberg 
follower) moves. For our game this means that given the optimal capital 
allocation decision of the capitalists (see equation (13)), that is, wand w*, 
the governments decide on the tax rates and redistribution. Given the 
tax rates and A, A* the private sector decides on where to invest. Solving 
backwards in this way requires a domestic government to maximize (16) 
or (17) with respect to its instruments taking its opponent's choices of 
( r*, A*) as given. I will consider each possible match between a right and 
a left-wing government, under the assumption that the economies are 
similar (A= A*) or significantly different (A> A*). 
6.1 The Right-wing Government's Problem 
Consider the domestic right-wing government's problem. From the closed 
economy solution we know that it will set A = 0. Using (16) it has to 
solve 
max vr s.t. r* given, A = 0. 
T 
I will suppress the time subscript 0 for Ck, k ( cf. (16)) in what is to 
follow. Then the FOC from (16) involves 
(21) 
Note that Ck = pk in steady state so that C~ = 0. For the growth rate 
I find 
/r = (r- r)wr + (rr- l)w + (r*- r*)¢r· 
Let us define I:] = r::::~., n; = r;~71 and n; = ;:~T\. Then from (13) 
one gets 
enforced is outside of this model. References for dynamic games are e.g. Petit (1990) 
and Basar and Olsder (1995). 
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The domestic capitalists' FOC then directly implies ¢.,.(r*- T*) +wr(r 
T) = 0 and so lT = (rr- 1) w. Similar definitions for >., i.e. nl, nL 
establish that />-. = r;..w. So the solution to (21) is given by T = f = 
[a(1 - a )A] i' and is identical to the solution of the right-wing govern-
ment's problem in a closed economy. Note that the optimal tax rate is 
independent of the degree of capital mobility ( z ), the efficiency in the 
foreign cmmtry A* and the opponent government's tax choice. 
Proposition 1 For any A, A*, :; and T~ a domestic Tight-wing govern-
ment will always choose T = f = [o:(l-a)A]!., i.e. the growth maximizing 
tax rate, irrespective of who its opponent is. 
This means that the best thing the right-wing governments can do is to 
pursue their national GNP growth ma.ximizing policies. It also implies 
that in the optimum the right-wing governments have a completely fi.xed 
reaction function since f is independent of any foreign policy instruments. 
6.2 The Left-wing Government's Problem 
Given Nash behaviour the domestic left-wing government has to take the 
policy choices of its opponent as given. Then the left-wing government's 
problem is given by 
ma.x {oo lnCt e-ptdt 
.,-,;.. Jo 
s.t. CjY = (rJ.(T, >.)+AT) E 1; 1{1 = wl..:0 et1 + ¢*k~e·t' 1 ; (22) 
). 2:: 0; T*, >. * given. 
This problem is not easily solved in general unless restrictions are put on 
how the opponent behaves or one rules out certain consumption paths. 
I will state these restrictions as I go along. 
6.3 Left-wing vs. Right-wing 
In this section I analyze the domestic left-wing government's problem if it 
has to compete in ta.x instnunents with a foreign right-wing government. 
24 
Assume that the economies are similar, that is, A = A*. From Propo-
sition 1 we know that the right-wing government will always set T = f. 
Then under common knowledge the left-wing government's problem in 
(22) is equivalent to 
max l/1 s.t. y* = f*' >. 2: 0 
r,.>. 
where l/1 is given by (17). Since the foreign right-wing government always 
sets y* = i*, and given A = A*, the domestic left-wing government 
cannot guarantee a higher after-tax return than the foreign right-wing 
government. But then it must be that w* = 1 and so </>*(w*) = 0 and 
rt = 'Y· Thus, the GDP and GNP growth rate will be the same for 
the domestic left-wing government and it will not be able to attract any 
foreign capital. One may then verify that the FOC is given by25 
VI= c;.v 'Yr =0, (23) --+-T p CJV p2 
v{ = >. ( Clv + /.>.) 
P CJV p2 =0. (24) 
As in the closed economy the left-wing government wants to set T 2: f 
for either maximization of wages or redistribution. But any tax rate 
T > f makes 'Yr in (23) negative since Tr < 1 for T > f. Recall that 
CJV = (1J + AT)Ko and notice that 
ri<f>•=O = / = (r- T)W + (r* y*)</>(w)- p 
since w < 1 as r* y* 2: r - T. From this I get that 
'Yr = (rr- 1)w + (r- T)Wr + (r*- T*)</>r· (25) 
Let I; = _!.::.!__ ~V = rr-1 Q2 = r,-1 Q1 = .I..L Q2 = ___!:.\.._ • Then 
1- r•-T*' T r-r' T r•-T•' .). r-r' A r*-T* 
"z r.1 Wr = ZLJ1 Hr, </>;. = -zi;~ n~. (26) 
Some algebra reveals that </>r(r*- y*) + (r T)wr = 0. Hence 'Yr = 
(rr - 1) w and analogously /.>. = 1";. w. Substituting the expressions 
25The .A(·) expression enters because of complementary slackness for >. ;::: 0. 
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above in (23) and (24) yields for an interior solution 
Tfr +A W.,-
--+-
rt+h w 
T/J.. + T W).. 
--+- = 
Tf +AT w 
1'- -1 
-'--w p , 
1').. 
- -w. 
p 
(27) 
(28) 
Multiplying these equations by the inverses of 1·,. -1 and r;.. resp., setting 
the resulting equations equal, some rearranging and noting that r ,.Tf;.. = 
r;.. Tfr establishes26 
[(1- a)A]!;-
T = 1 A . (29) 
This is the same result as in the closed economy case. So again T > f. 
Rearrange (27) to obtain 
Tfr +A [ z W] -l 
-- --+- =- (r,.-1). 
Tf+TA 1'-T p 
(30) 
Letting T -> f + the eA.l>ression r,. - 1 will be negative and so the RHS 
positive. From this one immediately gets that T -> f if z -> oo. Turning 
to redistribution I rearrange (28), use (29) and simplify in order to check 
26To see that this is true let a = 'lr+>- and a = ~.,+r Then I - ~+>.r 2 - ~+>.r· 
(27): a1 W.,- 1 -- + = - - w , (28) : 
r.,.- 1 w(r,.- 1) p 
a? W). 1 
-=- + -- = - - w. 
r.x w r.x p 
Thus we get r:!..l + w(:::T-1) = ~ + w"'~,. The definitions of n~, nl imply w(:::~l) = 
r~r = ww~-'. So we are left with r:!_ 1 = ~- Multiplication of both sides by (TJ +.h) 
yields (TJ,. + ..\)r;. = (TJ>. + r)(7'r- 1). From (7) and (8) we have r.,-71>. = r;.ry,. so that 
TJ>. + ..\r;. = rr,.- r which is identical to equation (B3) in appendix B. Solving yields 
(29). 
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whether 11  > 0 evaluated at A = U. The condition for this is27 
[(1- n)Ar~ > [___:._ + =::] 
!"- T p (31) 
The LHS is clearly positive. Suppose the workers are impatient28 (p 
large) rutd z-+ 0 (ncar autarky) then it is clearly possible that V1 > 0. 
However, since z E [0, 'Xi) there mnst be a z 0 , where V1 :::; 0." Thus, 
there exists a z > z0 where A = 0. Refer to the tax rate chosen for 
z E [0, z0] as 7° and the one chosen for ::: > :::0 as 7 1. Recall that r! =I 
for ¢* = 0. Identify the GDP growth rate, r, associated with T 0 as [ 0 
and the corresponding(:) as w0 , then it must be that ro < r; and w0 < 1 
with A > 0. Also, for every z > z0 , call it z 1, there will be an optimal tax 
rate T1• Call [ 1, w1 the GDP growth rate and capital allocation decision 
for that r 1 . Then w 1 < 1, A= 0, /'* > 'I and [ 1 < r;. To see this note 
that for the foreign right-wing government r~ = ,. + v·~( so that r < r~ 
is equivalent to ~f* > ;(1 v*) in the foreign economy. By Lemma 1 r; 
is increasing over time and in the limit equal to ~t. But then r < r; 
for T1 and T 0 and all f. From the argument about z --+ oo if follows 
that r ~ f. But any optimal Twill be a function of z. With T-+ f as 
z-+ oo it. may happen that in the limit ..u = 0 and so uw -+ -oo which 
cannot be optimal. Thus, I conclude that if z -+ oo a domestic left-wing 
government will definitely set T =fin the optimum. For this case define 
w2 and f 2 • Then w2 = 1 and f 2 = r•. Consequently f 0 < f 1 < f 2 where 
f 2 = r•. From these arguments I obtaiu29 
27Again let a2 = ~~~~· Using (26) it is true for (28) that a2 ~ - ( ~ + r,P w) = 
-n. (--=- + "'-)- . Then _!!.1_ = ''-'+r - . E\·ainatinrr at .\ = 0 implies _!!.2_ = '1'+r. \ r-r p -r.\ r.\fq+.\•) o -r.\ -r~.11 
Recall E = (1 - n ).4.[(1 - .\)r]-o and so '7 = EL r;. = -raE, TJ>. = -r(l- a)E from 
(6), (7), and (8). At .\ = 0 this implies -!!?:-; = r-;,~10-;_"j/. Now substitute for r from 
(29) . .\ = 0 implies E = 1 and so ~;_, = [(1- n}Ar-l-. Thus, for F{ > 0 we must 
have (31). 
28 Note that. extreme patience p --> 0, too, c:an~es the left-wing government to mimic 
a right wing one's policy. This is similar to the closed economy case. 
29 Notice that the proposition establishes thar ther:e will be steady state growth in 
the domestic economy, which may uot he the case for the foreign right-wing govern-
ment's economy. r; and so GDP increase owr time. I will interpret this as being 
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Proposition 2 For left-wing. Tight-wing competition and A. 
have 
A.* we 
1. For low degrees of capital mobility, :.: E [0, .:: 0 ] the domestic left-wing 
government sets T > f and A > 0. Then w0 < 1 and f 0 < r~. 
2. If z > z0 , there will be no redistribution, A = 0. The government 
just maximizes wages. Then w0 < w 1 < 1 and f 1 < r~. 
3. If z -too, i.e. capital mobility is emy perfect, the left-wing govern-
ment will mimic the right-wing government and will choose T = f. 
Then w2 = 1 and f 2 = 1' = r; and constant. 
Comparing the solutions with A= 0 for t};te left-wing government in the 
closed economy, (18), and the open economy case, (30), I find that wages 
will be lower when opening the economies up. Define f.x=o,w:l as the 
tax rate that the left-wing government sets in the closed economy and 
T.x=O,w$1 as the one in the two-country world. Then, if z > 0, one will 
observe f.x=o,w:l > T..\=O,w$1 so that wage maximization by a domestic left-
wing government may be adversely affected by a high degree of capital 
mobility in the optimum. I will express this as 
Corollary 1 For a domestic left-wing government facing a right-wing 
foreign government we have that t.\=O,w:l 2 f.x=O,w$I· Thus. wages will 
be lower in an open than in a closed economy. 
Two important features of Proposition 2 merit attention. First, left-
wing governments will not redistribute in equilibrium if capital mobility 
is high. The reason for this is that the effects of the concern for inequality 
is competed away by fear of losing capital. Capital is good to left-wing 
really good for the foreign workers. Howewr, the main foeus of this section is on the 
optimal behaviour of the dome.•tic government given the optimal behaviour of the 
foreign government. 
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governments for redistributive reasons an:d for wages. Facing tax compe-
tition the left-wing government is better off if it puts more emphasis on 
securing high wages instead of reclistrihution, if capital mobility is high. 
Also, with perfect capital mobility tllf' after-tax returns are equal across 
countries, capital is in fact indifferent where to go.30 This is so since in 
a situation where both countries are equally efficient and perfect capi-
tal mobility prevails both governments will optimally act as a right-wing 
government would by setting the GNP growth ma.ximizing tax rates. 
Second, since the right-wing goverument chooses a rather inflexible 
tax profile, the left-wing government can take this into account and will 
choose to redistribute if capital mobility is not high. This appears to be 
clue to a lack of strategic interaction. The left-wing government knows 
that it cannot influence the choice of the right-wing government and 
that is cannot attract foreign capital. Its best response is to take the 
optimal choice of the right-wing government as given and then solve its 
tax, redistribution problem.:n 
6.4 Left-wing vs. Left-wing 
Now the domestic left-wing government's problem is to choose tax in-
struments when facing a foreign left-wing government. Again, assume 
A= A*. Since capital is good for left-wing governments the best the do-
mestic left-wing government c<m do is to find optimal policies for given 
ta.x choices of its left-wing opponent. Then the domestic left-wing gov-
ernment's problem in (22) is given by 
max F 1 s.t. T* given, /\ 2: 0 . 
.-.>. 
30If z ---+ oc the solution to the capitalists' problem in (llb) takes a 'bang-bang' 
form. That case is analyzed in Rehme (1905b ). 
31 Note that this is still an outcome of a game. The right-wing government uses 
the w reaction function of the scr.ond stap;e of the p;;une. So even though the game 
collapses in the first stag" (fixed reaction). tlw optimal tax choice of the right-wing 
government is still the r"sult of a sequential ( (\\·o-stnp;e) game. 
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Maximization involves setting the derivatives v;;' and a;~' equal to zero 
for finding the optimum. I will now restrict the analysis to steady state 
paths with 'Y = 'Y*. So r, A must solve ( 881~ 1 ) = 0 where j = r, A. In ) ll=i· 
appendix C it is shown that under the steady state restriction, 'Y = 1*, 
the following FOC must be satisfied 
(32) 
(33) 
k </>•k• 
where v = ~(:, v* = Kon and the >.( ·) expression enters because of 
complementary slackness for ;\ 2: 0. The first two expressions on the LHS 
in (32) and (33) represent the effects of changes in the wage rate. The 
third expression shows how the growth rate, weighted by its contribution 
to the overall capital stocks, reacts to changes in policy. Notice that 
the steady state assumption implies that r = 1 = 'Y* so that in an 
equilibrium GDP and GNP grow at the same rate. 
From above (see equation ( 26)) we know that 'Yr = ( 7"r - 1 )w. For 
evaluation of -v* let :B =: ....!..=.!:._ I:? =: r•-r• Stl = rT-I and !;11 =: ....>:L. 
IT 1 r•-r•' .. r-T , T r-r A r-r 
Then 
(34) 
and w;(r*- r*) + <P;(r- r) = 0 so that 
Let a = 7IT+A a = 7l.\+r b = wTko-::-cf>;k~ and b = "'.\ko-J:4l;k;. Assume an 
1 71+Ar' 2 •I+Ar' I [,o 2 Ito 
interior solution for >. exists. From ( 32) and ( 33) it is trnr that 
r : al + bl = - !JW + !1*</J* and A : a2 + b2 !JW + v*</J* 
Tr -1 p rA p 
Setting these equations equal yields 
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It is not difficult, but cumbersome to verify that b11·).. = b2(1·r - 1).32 
Thus, we are left with expressions that yield the same result as in the 
1 
closed economy case, i.e. T = [O~~,\·!J". (See footnote 26.) Since I need 
this result later on I make it 
Lemma 5 Under left-right or left-left competition, for a (T, >.) solution 
1 
with).. 2': 0 the condition T = [(!~~);\]" has to be satisfied. 
Given everything else two left-wing governments would like to set f > f. 
But higher taxes mean that b1 is definitely negative since r r < 1 for 
T > f. So it follows that taxes, and hence wages, must be smaller in the 
open economy than in the closed one. ( Cf. Corollary 1 in the previous 
section.) Notice that 
Wrko + ¢;k(J 
Ko 
= z (~) ( r- T )z k~ + z (~) (r*- 7•)=+1 k~ 
r- T r*- r* !1.. 0 r- T r- 7 1(0 
so that we can rearrange equation (32) as follows 
ar [r~T ( C:=;. r ~: + (r~=;·r+l *) + vw+;•¢• rl (36) 
= -(rr- 1) 
Let T 0 solve this equation. If /..~0 = k~, our problem is completely sym-
metric in terms of strategy spaces (action sets), agents etc. Since the 
strategies are continuous variables and symmetric we are in fact contem-
plating a symmetric game. One can then apply the following theorem (see 
Lellillia 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) or Theorem 5.10 in Rasmusen 
(1989), p.l27, presented here) 
32The equality may be verified using (26) and (34) 
b1 r>.. 1/II: (zw il~ k + zw* il~ I:2 k*) 7'>.. 
b2 (rr -1) = 1/K (zw ill k + zw* ill I:2 k*) (rr -1) 
31 
Theorem 1 (Symmetric Equilibrium Theorem} Every symmet-
ric game that has an equilibrium has a symmetric equilibrium; that is, 
every game in which players' actions sets are identical at each point in 
time has an equilibrium in which mixing probabilities (perhaps equal to 
one) are identical. 
The theorem establishes that if the game has any Nash Equilibria at 
least one of them must be symmetric. For what is to follow I will only 
consider symmetric equilibria. (In appendix D I show that under the 
assumption "f = "(* all Nash Equilibria of the game are indeed unique 
and symmetric.)33 Symmetry entails T 0 = T*0 with T >f. Then it must 
be that r T = r*- T* :::; f- f so that w = 1, ¢* = 0, (w* = 1} and 
K 0 = k0 • This modifies b1 and leaves a1 as it is. Now T 0 would have to 
solve 
Now rearrange this equation to obtain 
TJT +). [-z- (k + /.;*) + ~] -1 = -(rT- 1). 
TJ +AT r - T k p 
(37) 
If z -+ oo then T 0 -+ f and if z -+ 0 then T 0 -+ f, where f is the left-wing 
government's tax choice in the closed economy. This last result already 
tells us that for low enough capital mobility>.> 0. Proceeding as before 
I impose symmetry on (33), rearrange it, use (29), simplify and check 
whether Vi > 0 evaluated at >. = 0. Then the condition for Vi > 0 
the assumption of 1 = 1*, that is, balanced growth, I show that the after-
tax returns must be equal and that this together with the FOC in (32) and (33) 
implies uniqueness and symmetry. An alternative procedure would have been to say 
at the beginning of this section that with k0 = k0 the game is symmetric and that I 
only consider symmetric equilibria. The justification for proceeding as above is that 
requiring 1 = 1* restricts the analysis to balanced growth paths and requires equal 
after-tax returns, which does not automatically require symmetry or uniqueness in 
tax parameters. So the adopted route is slightly more general. 
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becomes 
[(1- o:JAr~ > [(-=-) (/,; + /,;*) + ~]. 
.1"- T /,; p 
(38) 
The derivation is identical to the one presented in footnote 27 for the 
condition .A > 0 under left-right competition. It seems clear that as z 
becomes infinite, .A will definitely be set equal to zero and with z ....... 0 
one may get a positiw A. Furthermore, substituting (29) in (31) and 
solving for z establishes that there must be a z > 0, call it z3 , where 
V1 < 0 and so .A = 0. Given the symmetry of the problem, it follows that 
both left-wing governments set the same tax rate so that w = w* = 1 
and r = r•. Hence, 
Proposition 3 If A = A* and two left-wing governments compete in 
taxes then 
1. For z > z3 > 0 there will no redistribution .A= .A*= 0. 
2. The governments set the same tax rates so that w = w* and r = r•. 
3. If z ---> rx.;, then T ---> T and the left-wing governments act like 
right-wing one.s. 
6.5 Comparison of Left-Right with Left-Left Tax 
Competition 
Suppose we consider a domestic left-wing government that faces either 
another foreign left-wing govermnent or a foreign right-wing government. 
Comparing the conditions for redistribution, i.e. (38) of section 6.3 and 
(31) in 6.4, I find that the condition for redistribution is weaker if the 
domestic government faces a foreign right-\ving government. To see this 
consider the RHS of (38) and the RHS of (31). Notice that the LHS's of 
(38) and (31) are equal. Then for any z > 0 one obtains by comparison 
of the RHS's that [(-=-) (~) + ~] > l--=- + ~] . r-T k p r-T p 
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I conclude from this that the marginal utility of redistribution is reduced 
if a left-wing government competes in taxes with another left-wing gov-
ernment. 
One may check that exactly the same condition applies for a com-
parison of the optimal ta-\: choices, namely (30) and (37). So I conclude 
that a domestic left-wing government will set lower ta-\:es when competing 
with a foreign left-wing government than when confronting a right-wing 
government. The domestic left-wing government will only choose the 
same ta-\: rates if z = 0 or z -+ oo. Let us call the domestic left-wing 
government's tax choice r·1 when it faces a foreign right-wing opponent 
and r 5 when confronted with a foreign left-wing government. Similarly, 
define r4, r 5 , >.4 and .A5• Then the results may be stated as 
Proposition 4 If A= A* and the domestic left-wing government faces 
either a foreign right-wing or a foreign left-wing government, then for 
any z E [0, 00) we have r 5 2: r 4 ' X1 :::; ).5 and rs :::; r 4 . 
Thus, the proposition establishes that in two equally efficient economies 
a domestic left-wing government competing in ta-\: parameters will re-
distribute at least as much when facing a right-wing as when facing a 
left-wing government. Also, it ta-\:es wealth at least as much when facing 
a right-wing as when facing a left-wing government. Thus, for a left-
wing government it matters a lot who it competes with in taxes. The 
comparison between. the two possible opponents suggests that we may 
observe more GDP growth at the e::...-pense of less redistribution if the 
domestic left-wing government faces a foreign left-wing government. Al-
ternatively, one may observe more redistribution and less GDP growth 
if the domestic left-wing government competes with a foreign right-wing 
government. 
The reason for this result lies in the fact that in this model the 
right-wing government guarantees that w* = 1 so that the left-wing gov-
ernment has no chance to attract foreign capital. The strategic inter-
action between two left-wing governments is more intense because each 
government may get some capital off its left-wing opponent. This is in 
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conflict with more redistribution (higher -\), but may be worthwhile in 
terms of wages. 
If z -;. 0 the strategic element in finding the optimal tax rate be-
comes less important. Then it makes sense that a left-wing goverD.IL.ent 
sets the same ta.xes as in the closed economy. On the other hand, if capi-
tal mobility is nearly perfect, z ---> x, the left-wing government optimally 
mimics a right-wing one for fear of losing capital. 
6.6 Different Technological Efficiency 
The results so far only apply under the assumption of equal efficiency. In 
contrast, suppose now that the domestic government has a more efficient 
technology so that A. > A*. For the closed economy we know from 
Lemma 3 that f > i• and r- f > r*- i• if A > A*. Proposition 1 tells us 
that two right-wing governments will always choose national GNP growth 
maximizing policies. Then it is clear that the right-wing government with 
a more efficient economy will get more capital and experience higher GDP 
growth. 
The other constellations of the game, i.e. left-right and right-right 
competition, are not easily analyzed. I will only make a few observations 
on the nature of possible equilibria in this section. Take the left-wing 
government. Before imposing symmetry I have shown in section 6.4 for 
a domestic left-wing government that the optimal choice of 7 is obtained 
by solving equation (36), which I present again for convenience 
a
1 
[-z- (( :- 7.)= k~ + (r*- r*)=+l k~) + vw + v*¢*] -I 
r - 7 r - T !1. 0 r - T !1. 0 p 
=-(r,.-1) 
where a1 = ~:;_~;. For any foreign vs. domestic after-ta.x return combina-
tions and A - A* = E with E very small notice that as z ---> oo we have 
that 7-;. f and A = 0. So I conclude that for slight efficiency differences 
and very high degrees of capital mobility, the domestic, more efficient 
economy with a left-wing government has higher GDP growth than its 
right-wing opponent. 
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Proposition 5 If z """""' oo and A.- A.* =E. E > 0 and small, a domestic 
left-wing government will have higher GDP growth than a foreign right-
wing government, r > r· = 0. 
It is interesting to note that a situation where A > A* and z """""' oo 
is really bad for the workers in the inefficient, foreign country, because 
as z """""' oo we may get w* = O,w = 1 and (TJ* + >..*r*)E* = 0 and so 
U( cw·) """""' -oo. This means that it is really crucial for the workers under 
a left-wing government to have an efficient economy if capital mobility 
is very high. Since the left-wing government only represents domestic 
workers in this model (a form of left-wing nationalism), the policy of a 
domestic left-wing government with an efficient economy may cause the 
foreign workers to starve in the inefficient economy. 
Ne:x'i, notice that for very high differences in (A, A*) it may well 
be possible that a domestic left-wing government redistributes wealth, 
grows more than and gets at least as much capital as its right-wing 
counterpart, even if capital mobility is very low. Suppose z ~ 0, then 
one gets approximately the same solution as for the closed economy case. 
I 
From Lemma 5 we know that the solution involves r = [( 1 ~~;r". Lemma 
4 tells us that for positive GNP growth and wealth redistribution we must 
have that private capital is more important than public inputs, that is, 
a > ~' which I assume to hold now. I will now check whether it is 
possible for a domestic left-wing government to have 'Y ~ 'Y* with>.. > 0, 
if the foreign government is right-wing with an inefficient economy. Now 
'Y ~ 'Y* and A > A* involves 
r-r 
a -p ~ i• - i• - p {:} r - r > -- r* 
-1-a (see Lemma 3). 
Notice that r = 1~,.[(1- a)A]~ under Lemma 5 so that for 'Y ~ 'Y* we 
must have 
1 ~a ([(1 a)A]~- [a(1- a)A*J~) ~ r. 
For redistribution(>.. > 0) we need r > [(1- a)A]L Now if P ~ x and 
x > Q then Px > Qx so that 
1 ~,. ([(1- a)A]~- [a(1- a)A*]~) r > r [(1 a)A]~ 
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( 1) Q l. ·1· -;; >1 {::} -. 1 - 0'" ( '---) 1-n A 
ca 1 r ~ A* {::} >A. a n· 
Assuming Lemma 4 holds we have 0:: > ~ which means that the LHS is 
smaller than 0.946. If we let A= xA*, .1: > 1, the inequality holds if 
x > 1.056 so that in this model an efficiency advantage of, say, 6 percent 
in a world of very low capital mobility (z ~ 0) is enough for a left-wing 
government to be able to redistribute wealth and grow at least at the 
same rate as its right-wing opponent's economy. 
Proposition 6 If z ~ 0 and a > ~' then for some A > A* a domestic 
left-wing government may redistribute and grow at least at the same rate 
as its right-wing opponent's economy, that is, 1 2: 1* and >. > 0 and 
r;::: r·. 
For all other degrees of capital mobility exact solutions are difficult to 
obtain. One may conjecture that there should always be (z,A) combi-
nations that guarantee that a domestic government redistributes wealth 
and has higher GDP growth so that the solutions should be somewhere 
between those found in Propositions 5 and6. From this I conclude that it 
is important for the workers, as well as the capital owners to live in an effi-
cient economy, because this is good in terms of welfare and GDP growth 
and may mitigate the effects of tax competition in a non-cooperative 
environment. 
7 Conclusion 
Employing the frame\vork of a simple growth model with distributional 
conflicts seems to imply that if one taxes wealth, the growth rate is 
reduced by redistribution. This is the argument presented for example 
in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Bertola (1993) and would suggest that 
redistribution always implies lower growth. 
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If one extends the growth redistribution trade-off problem to a two-
country world with varying degrees of capital mobility and introduces 
non-cooperative behaviom, by which governments compete in wealth tax 
rates using the source principle, the possibility of losing capital features 
saliently in the optimal decisions of a government that wishes to redis-
tribute. 
It is shown that in a situation where the opponent's economy is 
equally efficient and capital mobility is sufficiently high, no redistribution 
may take place in the optimum for two left-wing governments. This may 
hold even though both care about redistribution. The intuitive reason 
for this is that capital is good for left-wing governments. Losing capital 
reduces wages and the utility loss of a government incurred by a drop in 
wages outweighs the utility gain derived from redistribution. However, 
the workers are compensated for this by higher wages. 
If a right-wing and a left-wing government compete in taxes, the 
right-wing government will optimally pursue its domestically preferred 
policy (GNP growth maximization in this model) and not be influenced 
by its opponent's tax choice. From this the right-wing government's re-
action to any opponent's ta.x choice is very unresponsive in this model. 
Since the right-wing government guarantees the maximum after-ta.x re-
turn for its capital owners when both economies are equally efficient, a 
competing left-wing government is unable to attract foreign capital. It 
is then optimal for the left-wing government to redistribute at least as 
much as it would wl:_J.en competing with another left-wing government. 
It is shown that as capital mobility increases, tax competition intensifies 
and the left-wing governments begin to mimic right-wing policies. 
If the countries are technologically different, i.e. one country is more 
efficient than another one, then more capital will locate in the efficient 
country. If the efficient country wishes to redistribute, it can afford to 
do so at the e:X'J>ense of losing some capital. Hence, the amount of redis-
tribution depends on who the opponent is and on the efficiency gap that 
distinguishes it from its opponents. From this last point one may con-
clude that policies that are geared to make an economy more efficient are 
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in the interest of both workers and capital mYners. This holds especially 
true for workers "'ith a left-,,·ing gonmunent. 
Finally, in the model one would observe left-wing goverlllllents to 
behave differently in the optimum when facing different opponents. If 
the opponent is left-wing (same preferences) it will choose higher GDP 
growth and higher wages at the cost of reduced redistribution. If it 
confronts a right-wing government it will redistribute at least as much 
at the expense of lower GDP growth. This result again hinges on the 
intensity of strategic interaction and the degree of capital mobility. 
In this paper it is argued that high GDP growth and redistribution 
may be possible with a large enough efficiency gap or low enough capital 
mobility. Government preferences alone may then not adequately explain 
the pattern of redistribution and GDP growth in open economies with 
wealth tax: competition, differences in strategic behaviour and varying 
degrees of factor mobility. 
Several caveats apply. I have considered wealth taxes as a tax base. 
Other tax base choices may change the results in a two-country world 
considerably. (See, for instance Rehme (1995a).) I have abstracted from 
questions of time inconsistency. If goverlllllents could condition on the 
whole history of the game the outcome might well be different. I have 
not analyzed the effects of tariffs on capital flight. It is quite likely 
that a country that e:x.-periences capital outflows will set up tariffs. It 
would also be desirable to use a less aggregated set-up when investigating 
the trade-off problem. In reality workers own capital and some of the 
well capital endowed work. These and other problems provide room for 
further e:x.-tensions of this model and for more research on the trade-off 
between grov.rth and redistribution. 
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Appendix 
A The left and right-wing welfare mea-
sures 
By assumption T,T* and so w,w* and 1,1* are constant. For the right-
wing government the welfare integral is given by vr = Jci ln C~ e-pt. Let 
t -t co and use integration by parts. For this define V2 = ln c~' and 
dvl = e-Pldt. Recall that c~ = pkt. Then dv2 = CkjCk = I and 
constant in steady state, and vi= _l e-pt_ Then p 
fo':o lnCt e-pt dt = -~ [lnCt e-pt]: +~loco 1 e-pt dt 
= lnC~ - ~ [1 e-pt]co {A1) 
p p2 0 
where C0 = pk0 • Evaluation at the particular limits yields the expression 
of vr in (16). 
The left-wing government's welfare integral is given by V1 = Jci ln C[V e-pt. 
Now let t -+ co and define v2 = lnC[V, and dvi = e-P1dt. Recall 
c;v = (17 + AT)Kt. Then dv2 = c~w jC[V = ft, and VI = _l e-pt_ p 
Thus, 
which is equivalent to the expression for V 1 in {17). From (15) 
which depends on time so that one would have to evaluate foco rl e-pt dt 
if one wanted to find a definite solution. 
Next turn to the properties of V 1 and vr with respect to k1, k;. 
First note that dl~ic; 2': 0, for i = W, k , j = kt, k; and Vt. For two 
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paths /,;It > k2t for all t, one has lu CL > ln c~t for i = lY, k. But then 
welfare must also be higher, that is, [,oo luCi 1e-"1dt > fnoo lnC~1 e-"1dt. 
Similarly, for k;1 > k21 one obtainf> lx- lnC~Ye-"1 dt > 100 lnC~!' e-"1dt 
d ["cl k -ptf ('"'1 •k -pt · dlnCt . • an Jo n Clle ( t = Jo n C21 e dt smce dk~ = 0. So mcreases m 
k1 raise the welfare of capitalists and workers and increases in 1.:; raise the 
workers' welfare only. Since~:, = /.:ile-'1 and k; = k0e·!"t increases in k0 , /,;0 
and in~(, -y* increase /,;11 1.:; and hence the workers' welfare. Increases in 
k0 ,~t increase the capital owners' welfare. Finally, since ¥u, d]: where 
v = r, r*, >., >. • exist, the welfare measures arc continuous in the tax 
parameters. 
B Derivation of the optimal solutions 
The government solves 
max (1- j3) F' + (3 V 1 s.t. ). 2': 0 
r,>. 
The first order conditions for T and .\ are given by 
f3 17,.. + .\ + ~(,.. = o . >. (e 77>- + r + ~~>-) = o 
(q + .\r)p p2 · · (ry + .\r)p p2 
Concentrating on an interior solution for .\, simplifying and rearranging 
one obtains 
f] Tf,. + A. = - ~~,. • /3 TJ>. + T = - ~(>. 
(ry+h) p · (ry+>.r) p (B1) 
Notice that ~f,. must he negative for the first equation to hold, so in the 
optimum T > f by Lemma 2. Division of these two equations by one 
another yields 
1],. +). 
1/,\ + T 
(B2) 
and must hold in an optimum with ). > 0. Since -(.\ = 1">. and /'.,- = r,.- 1 
I get (17r +). )r>. = ( IJ>. + r )( r,. - 1) which upon multiplying out becomes 
(B3) 
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Notice that T>.Tlr = 1"r1]>. and that 17 = 1:"' r. Then AT>.= TrT- 1:"r>.- T 
and so 
( 1- a) ( 1 - o:) rr T A + -- '1"). = T1"r - T ¢:} A + -- = _r - -a a '1">. 1">. 
Recall Tr = aE(1- A), '1">. = o:E( -r) where E = (1- a)A.[(1- A)rJ-" as 
in (7). Then 7:" = _m!~;>.) = -(1- ..\). So for above 
1- a r 
A+ (1- A)+-- = -- ¢:} 
a 1">. 
which means that E = 1 and so 
[(1- a)A.]~ 
T= 1-A . 
7"). 
-=-T 
a 
(B4) 
For the first order condition for r with E = 1 note that TJ = (1 -
a)A[(1- A)rp-a = E[(1- A)r] = [(1 a)A]~. Furthermore, 1Jr = 
l (1- a)(1- A), rr = a(1- A). Then from (B4) we have A= 1- [(l-~rl]" 
so that 
1 ( [(1- a)A]~) 1J +AT= [(1- a)Ap> + r 1- r = r. 
Then the first order condition for r becomes 
(3 1Jr + A = _ ~lr ¢:} 1]r + A = _ /'r ¢:} 
(7J+Ar) p r f3p 
T 
= fT - f3p" 
For an interior solution r must solve this equation, but the solution must 
also satisfy (B2). Let D = 13r and note that 1Jr+>. = -D = 1J.,+r and so P ~ n 
_Ir_ = -1/D = __:n_ and hence 'lr+>. = -D = _Ir_ = -1/D. Thus, 
'lr+>. 'l~+r -lr !]r+>. 
-i = -D, D = 1 so that the solution satisfies r = f3p. So one gets 
- [(1- a)A]~ f = Bp and A= 1 - .::.;__---,---=--
' f]p (B5) 
which is equation (18). So .A 2:0 only if f]p 2: [(1- o:)A.]~. 
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Suppose >. = 0, then the first order condition for T becomes 
TJr 1'r-1 (1-o:)£ 
- = --- ¢:} = 
TJ fip TE 
o:E -1 
¢:? (1- o:),Bp = T- o:TE 
:3p 
so that the solution with >. = 0 is given by 
(1- o:)fip = T [1- o:(1- o:)AT-a] (B6) 
which holds only if f]p < [(1- o:)A]~. For the right-wing (fi = 0) 
government the first order conditions are given by 
Since />. = 1'>. < 0 we have >. = 0 and because lr = r r - 1 = 0 we have 
T= f. 
C The left-wing government's problem 
Recall the left-wing government's problem in (22), that is, 
max (XJ lnCiv e-ptdt 
r,>. Jo 
s.t. c;v = (TJ(T, >.)+AT) J(h J(t = wkoe'11 + <P*k'Qe-r*t, ). 2:: 0. 
I look for constant policy parameters in the optimum. To this end employ 
the Leibniz Rule and differentiate through the integral 
where the expression for >. enters because of complementary slackness. 
The derivatives in the brackets are given by 
DC[v 1 (TJr+>-)Et+(J7+AT) 8£~· TJr+>- oK1 1 
----= '=--+--
aT c:v ( TJ + AT )Et 17 + >. T aT Kt 
act 1 (7J;.+T)Kt+(TJ+AT) 8£~· lJ>.+T aEt 1 
----., = . = -- + --.. 
a>. C:1 ( 17 +AT )I~~ 17 + >.T a>. Bt 
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Now let 6.1 = ~:;_!; and 0 1 = ~~t and notice that 6.~, 0 1 are constant. 
For the change in Et I obtain 
8Kt/fh -6. 6. _ (wr+lrwt)e"Y1ko (¢;+1;¢*t)e"Y•tk~ 
Kt - 2 + 3 - wk0 e"Yt + ¢•e-y·tk0 + wkoe-yt + ¢•e-y•tk0 
fJJ(t/fJ).. -G G _ (w.\+I>.Wt)e"Ylko (</J1+11if>*t)e"Y· 1 k~ 
Kt - 2 + 3 - wk0 e"Yt + </J*e1·tk0 + wkoe"Y1 + </J*e"Y· 1k0 
h I h d fin d A _ (wr+""frWI)eY'ko d A e e al l w ere ave e e u2 = wkoe..,'+.P•e..,•'k(j an u3, 2, 3 an ogous y. 
Notice that these expressions are not constant, but depend on time in a 
complex way. With the definitions I reformulate the optimality condi-
tions in ( C1) as 
T : fo':c (6.1 + 6.2 + 6.3 ) e-P1dt = 0 
).. : ).. (["' (81 + 82 + 83) e-ptdt) = 0. 
(C2) 
(C3) 
By Lemma 1 ft is increasing over time and approaches max(!, 1*). In 
what is to follow I will concentrate on steady state paths. For steady state 
growth 1 = 1*. Let us focus on the optimality condition for r. Imposing 
• t t (wr+lrwt)e"Ytko 1 = 1* entails B.t = wk0 e"Y + <jJ*k~e"Y and so 6.2 = .· = l'!..t 
(wr + lrwt)ko ( ¢; + l;¢*t)e"Y1 k~ ( ¢; + l;¢*t)k~ Th 
Ko and 6.3 = Kt = Ko · en 
(C2) becomes 
1oo 1 100 ((wr + J_rwt)ko) e-ptdt 0 6.1e-P dt. + o l'!..o 
+ roo ( ( ¢; + ~~<P*t)k~) e-P1dt = 0. 
lo 1\.o 
For the evaluation of each integral notice that 
00 [ 1 t ] 00 1 fo te-ptdt = - p2ept - pePt o = p2. 
Then it is not difficult to verify that 
44 
From (Cl) and (C2) I may now express the FOC forT under the steady 
state condition ~I = ~f* as 
=0 
which is equivalent to the expression in (32). Analogous reasoning es-
tablishes that for an interior solution for >. 
which corresponds to equation ( 33) in the text. 
D Symmetry and Uniqueness of Nash Equi-
libria in the Left-Left Tax Competition 
Game when I"'\/- rv* I- I 
If/'="/, then 
(r- r)w + (r*- r*) 0{w)- p = (r·- r*)w* + (r- r) ¢*(w*)- p 
has to be satisfied. Rearranging and cancelling p implies 
( 1'-T). ·• * , -- ["'-'-Q]=w -Q. 
_ r*- r* 
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(Dl) 
Now let 2:1 = --- and recall (
7'-7) 
?'* r* 
,/.. - -. z (1 - '\'=+1) 
' 'I' - ;; + 1 '-'1 ' 
dJ* = ~ (1 - ,-=-1) 
' · z+1 '-'1 • 
Any Nash Equilibrium in ( r, >., r*, >. *) must be such that either I; 1 < 1 
or :E1 > 1 or :E1 = 1. Suppose 2:1 < 1. Then w* = 1 by the optimal 
behaviour of the capital owners, equation (13), and so </>* = 0. Then 
(D1) reduces to 
I;l w 1-¢ 
'\'Z+1 -- 1 Z Z '<'-+J 
-'-'
1 
- ::; + 1 + ::; + 1 LJi 
(z + 1):E~+l = (z + 1)- z + zB~+l 
'\'=+1 -- 1 
"-'! 
which can only be satisfied if :E1 = 1, hence, contradicting our assumption 
that L:1 < 1. Next, suppose B1 > 1. Then w = 1 and¢= 0 by equation 
(13). From (D1) this implies that 
(z+1)L:]" 
which again can only be satisfied if B1 = 1, contradicting the assumption 
that B1 > 1. Therefore, we must have E1 = 1 in equilibrium if 1 = 1*, 
that is, the after-ta.-x: returns must be equal. It is not difficult to see 
that L:1 = 1 indeed satisfies the conclition 1 = ~(*. So I conclude that 
any Nash Equilibrium in (r,>.,r*,.A*) that satisfies 1 =~/must satisfy 
7' - T = 7'* - r*. 
Given symmetry with respect to technology, preferences, action sets 
etc. the after-ta.-x: functions ( 7' - r, r* - r*) are symmetric. Given that 
r r first (strictly) increases and then (strictly) decreases in r we may 
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have two tax rates T that sustain the same after-tax return as can be seen 
from Figure 1. Thus, in order to get tmiqueness I must check whether 
only one of the tax parameters will be chosen in equilibrilllll. To this end 
I will distinguish two cases. 
First, suppose an interior solution with A 2: 0, A* 2: 0 would be 
Nash Equilibrium. Then the FOC in (32), (33) and Lemma 5 tell us that 
[(1- a)A.J*" 
T = .::..:_---'---=--1-A d 
* [(1- a)AJ*" 
an T = .::..;_---'---'---
1 -A* 
must hold in any possible Nash Equilibrilllll with A 2: 0, A* 2: 0. Since 
r = aA[(1- A)Tp-a and 1(1- A)= [(1- a)A]<'> it is not difficult to see 
that 
a 1 
r = -- [(1- a)A.]o = r*. 
1-a 
So Lemma 5 implies r = r* and under the condition 1' = 1*, that is, 
2::1 = 1, this implies that T = ,. and so A= A*. From this I conclude 
that any Nash EquilibriUlll with A 2: 0, A* 2: 0 satisfying 1' = 1* must be 
symmetric. Furthermore, from th~ optimality condition of Lemma 5 and 
for A 2: 0 we must 
[(1- a)A]<'> 1 , 0:::; A= 1- ~ T 2: [(1- a)A]o > [a(1- a)A]o = f 
T 
so that r > f and so by symmetry 7* > f. But since then either after-tax 
return function is (strictly) decreasing in r or r* the ta.x rates chosen in 
equilibrilllll would have to be tmique. Hence, in any Nash Equilibrilllll 
with (A, A* 2: 0) and 1 = ~t*, the equilibrilllll must be symmetric and 
unique. 
Next, I have to check whether any equilibrium with A= 0, A* = 0 
will be symmetric and unique under the assumption 1' = 1*. In this case 
equation (32) with A =A* = 0 must be analyzed. Now 1' = 1* requires 
r - T == r* - r"' 
which allows for two symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria. (See 
Figure 1.) I will now show that the condition of equal after-tax returns 
47 
allows for a unique equilibrimn only. In equilibrimn the FOC in ( 32) must 
be satisfied for an interior solution in r. Under the condition 1 = 1* and 
so equal after-tax returns 
F,.(.A=.A* =O)= T]r +z (rr-1) (k+k*) + (r,.-1) =O 
q r-T /,; p 
where q,.jq > 0 for all r E [0, 1]. Suppose r < i would hold in equilib-
rimn. Since r,.- 1 > 0 for r < i, marginal utility F,. would be positive 
which cannot be the case in equilibrimn. Thus, any equilibrimn combi-
nation ( r, r*) must be such that r, r* ~ i. But if 1 = 1* in equilibrimn 
the equilibrimn ( r, r*) combination must be unique and symmetric. This 
follows since the after-tax ftmctions are symmetric and so only T = r* 
satisfy r - r = r* - r*. Also, for r = r* > i the after-tax functions 
are (strictly) decreasing so that given the parameters of the model, any 
equilibrimn combination must be unique. 
Hence, any Nash Equilibrimnin (r,.A,r*,.A*) that satisfies 1 = 1* 
must be unique and symmetric. 
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